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ABSTRACT
An important use of private data is to build machine learning classi-
fiers. While there is a burgeoning literature on differentially private
classification algorithms, we find that they are not practical in real
applications due to two reasons. First, existing differentially private
classifiers provide poor accuracy on real world datasets. Second,
there is no known differentially private algorithm for empirically
evaluating the private classifier on a private test dataset.
In this paper, we develop differentially private algorithms that
mirror real world empirical machine learning workflows. We con-
sider the private classifier training algorithm as a blackbox. We
present private algorithms for selecting features that are input to
the classifier. Though adding a preprocessing step takes away some
of the privacy budget from the actual classification process (thus
potentially making it noisier and less accurate), we show that our
novel preprocessing techniques signficantly increase classifier ac-
curacy on three real-world datasets. We also present the first private
algorithms for empirically constructing receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves on a private test set.
1. INTRODUCTION
Organizations, like statistical agencies, hospitals and internet com-
panies, collect ever increasing amounts of information from indi-
viduals with the hope of gleaning valuable insights from this data.
The promise of effectively utilizing such ‘big-data’ has been real-
ized in part due to the success of off-the-shelf machine learning
algorithms, especially supervised classifiers [3]. As the name sug-
gests, a classifier assigns to a new observation (e.g., an individual,
an email, etc.) a class chosen from a set of two or more class la-
bels (e.g., spam/ham, healthy/sick, etc.), based on training exam-
ples with known class membership. However, when classifiers are
trained on datasets containing sensitive information, ensuring that
the training algorithm and the output classifier does not leak sensi-
tive information in the data is important. For instance, Fredrikson
et al [8] proposed a model inversion attack using which properties
(genotype) of individuals in the training dataset can be learnt from
linear regression models built on private medical data.
To address this concern, recent work has focused on develop-
ing private classifier training algorithms that ensure a strong notion
of privacy called ǫ-differential privacy [6] – the classifier output
by a differentially private training algorithm does not significantly
change due to the insertion or deletion of any one training example.
Differentially private algorithms have been developed for training
Naive Bayes classifiers [25], logistic regression [2], support vector
machines [23] and decision trees [9]. All of these techniques work
by infusing noise into the training process.
Despite the burgeoning literature in differentially private classifi-
cation, their adoption by practitioners in the industry or government
agencies has been startlingly rare. We believe there are two impor-
tant contributing factors. First, we observe that (see experiments
in Section 5) an off-the-shelf private classifier training algorithm,
when running on real datasets, often results in classifiers with mis-
classification rates that are significantly higher than that output by
a non-private training algorithm. In fact, Fredrikson et al [8] also
show that differentially private algorithms for the related problem
of linear regression result in unacceptable error when applied to
real medical datasets.
Second, the state-of-the-art private classification algorithms do
not support typical classification workflows. In particular, real datasets
usually have many features that are of little to no predictive value,
and feature selection techniques [5] are used to identify the predic-
tive subset of features. To date there are no differentially private
feature selection techniques.
Moreover, empirical machine learning workflows perform model
diagnostics on a test set that is disjoint from the training set. These
diagnostics quantify trained classifier’s prediction accuracy on un-
seen data. Since the unseen data must be drawn from the same
distribution as the training dataset, the classifier is usually trained
on a part of the dataset, and tested on the rest of the dataset. Since
we assume the training dataset is private, the test dataset used for
evaluating the classifier’s prediction accuracy is also private.
A typical diagnostic for measuring the prediction accuracy of a
binary classifier (i.e., two classes) is the receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curve. Recent work [19] has shown that releasing an
ROC curve computed on a private test set can leak sensitive infor-
mation to an adversary with access to certain properties of the test
dataset. Currently, there is no known method to privately evaluate
the prediction accuracy of a classifier on a private test dataset.
Contributions: This paper addresses the aforementioned short-
comings of the current state-of-the-art in differentially private clas-
sification. We consider the differentially private classification algo-
rithms as a black box in order to ensure that (a) our algorithms are
classifier agnostic, and (b) a privacy non-expert can use our algo-
rithms without any knowledge of how a private classifier works.
First, we develop a suite of differentially private feature selection
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techniques based on (a) perturbing predictive scores of individual
features, (b) clustering features and (c) a novel method called pri-
vate threshold testing (which may be of independent interest with
applications to other problems). In non-private workflows, training
a classifier on a subset of predictive features helps reduce the vari-
ance in the data and thus results in more accurate classifiers. With
multi-step differentially private workflows, either each step of the
workflow should work with a different subset of the data, or more
noise must be infused in each step of the workflow. Thus it is not
necessarily obvious that a workflow constituting private feature se-
lection followed by private classification should improve accuracy
over a workflow that executes a private classifier on the original
data. Nevertheless, we show on real datasets and with two differ-
entially private classifiers (Naive Bayes [25] and logistic regression
[2]) that private feature selection indeed leads to significant im-
provement in the classifiers prediction accuracy. In certain cases,
our differentially private algorithms are able to achieve accuracies
attained by non-private classifiers.
Second, we develop novel algorithms for constructing the ROC
curve given a classifier and a private test set. An ROC curve is con-
structed by computing the true and false positive rates on different
subsets of the data. In the non-private case, typically t subsets are
chosen, where t is the size of the test dataset. The main issue is
that these subsets of the test dataset are overlapping and, hence, the
true positive and false positive rates are correlated. Thus, a naive
algorithm that directly adds noise to the t sets of counts results in
ROC curves that are very different from the true ROC curve. We
solve the first challenge by (a) carefully choosing the subsets using
a differentially private recursive partitioning scheme, and (b) mod-
eling the computation of the correlated true and false positive rates
as one of privately answering a workload of one sided range queries
(a problem that is well studied in the literature). Thus we can utilize
algorithms from prior work ([27]) to accurately compute the statis-
tics needed for the ROC curve. The utility of all our algorithms are
comprehensively evaluated on three high dimensional datasets.
Organization: Section 2 introduces the notation. Section 3 de-
scribes our novel feature selection algorithms. We discuss private
evaluation of classifiers in Section 4. Experimental results on three
real world datasets are presented in Section 5. Finally, we discuss
related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2. NOTATION
Let D be a dataset having d attributes, and let D denote the set
of all such datasets. One of the attributes is designated as the la-
bel L. The remainder of the attributes are called features F . We
assume that all the attributes are binary (though all of the results
in the paper can be extended to non-binary features). For instance,
in text classification datasets (used in our experiments) binary fea-
tures correspond to presence or absence of specific words from a
prespecified vocabulary.
For any tuple t in dataset D, let t[L] denote the value of the
label of the tuple, and t[F ] denote value of feature F for that tuple.
We assume that feature vectors are sparse; every tuple has at most
s features with t[F ] 6= 0. We denote by n the number of tuples
in D, and by nψ the number of tuples in the dataset (Dψ) that
satisfy a boolean predicate ψ. For instance, nF=1∧L=1 denotes the
number of tuples t that satisfy t[F ] = 1 ∧ t[L] = 1. We define by
PD(ψ) = nψ/n the empirical probability of ψ in the dataset D.
2.1 Differential Privacy
An algorithm satisfies differential privacy if its output on a dataset
does not significantly change due to the presence or absence of any
single tuple in the dataset.
DEFINITION 1 (DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY [6]). Two datasets
are called neighbors, denoted by (D1, D2) ∈ N if either D1 =
D2 ∪ {t} or D2 = D1 ∪ {t}. A randomized algorithm M satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy if ∀s ∈ range(M) and ∀(D1, D2) ∈ N ,
Pr[M(D) = s] ≤ eǫ · P [M(D′) = s] (1)
Here, ǫ is the privacy parameter that controls how much an ad-
versary can distinguish between neighboring datasets D1 and D2.
Larger ǫ corresponds to lesser privacy and permits algorithms that
retain more information about the data (i.e., utility). A variant
of the above definition where neighboring datasets have the same
number of tuples, but differ in one of the tuples is called bounded
differential privacy.
Algorithms that satisfy differential privacy work by infusing noise
based on a notion called sensitivity.
DEFINITION 2 (GLOBAL SENSITIVITY). The global sensitiv-
ity of a function f : D → Rm, denoted by S(f) is defined as the
largest L1 difference ||f(D1)−f(D2)||1, where D1, D2 are neigh-
boring. More formally,
S(f) = max
(D1,D2)∈N
||f(D1)− f(D2)||1 (2)
A popular differentially private algorithm is the Laplace mecha-
nism [7] defined as follows:
DEFINITION 3. The Laplace mechanism, denoted by MLap,
privately computes a function f : D → Rm by computing f(D) +
η. η ∈ Rm is a vector of independent random variables, where
each ηi is drawn from the Laplace distribution with parameter
S(f)/ǫ. That is, P [ηi = z] ∝ e−z·ǫ/S(f).
Differentially private algorithms satisfy the following composi-
tion properties that allow us to design complex workflows by piec-
ing together differentially private algorithms.
THEOREM 1 (COMPOSITION [20]). LetM1(·) andM2(·) be
ǫ1- and ǫ2-differentially private algorithms. Then,
• Sequential Compositon: Releasing the outputs of M1(D)
and M2(D) satisfies ǫ1 + ǫ2-differential privacy.
• Parallel Composition: ReleasingM1(D1) andM2(D2), where
D1 ∩D2 = ∅ satisfies max(ǫ1, ǫ2)-differential privacy.
• Postprocessing: Releasing M1(D) and M2(M1(D)) satis-
fies ǫ1-differential privacy. That is, postprocessing an output
of a differentially private algorithm does not incur any addi-
tional loss of privacy.
Hence, the privacy parameter ǫ is also called the privacy budget,
and the goal is to develop differentially private workflows that max-
imize utility given a fixed privacy budget.
3. PRIVATE FEATURE SELECTION
In this section, we present differentially private techniques for
feature selection that improve the accuracy of differentially private
classifiers. We consider the classifer as a blackbox.
More formally, a classifier C takes as input a record of fea-
tures and outputs a probability distribution over the set of labels.
Throughout this paper we consider binary classifiers; i.e., L =
{0, 1}. Thus without loss of generality we can define the classi-
fier as outputting a real number p ∈ [0, 1] which corresponds to the
probability of L = 1. Two examples of such classifiers include the
Naive Bayes classifier and logistic regression [3].
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Feature selection is a dimensionality reduction technique that
typically precedes classification, where only a subset of the fea-
tures F ′ ⊂ F in the dataset are retained based on some criterion of
how well F ′ predicts the label L [11]. The classifier is then trained
on the dataset restricted to features in F ′. Since features are se-
lected based on their properties in the data, the fact that a feature
is selected can allow attackers to distinguish between neighboring
datasets. Thus, by sequential composition, one needs to spend a
part of the total privacy budget ǫ for feature selection (say ǫfs), and
use the remainder (ǫ− ǫfs) for training the blackbox classifier.
Feature selection methods can be categorized as filter, wrapper
and embedded methods [11]. Filter methods assign scores to fea-
tures based on their correlation with the label, and are independent
of the downstream classification algorithm. Features with the best
scores are retained. Wrappers are meta-algorithms that score sets
of features using a statistical model. Embedded techniques include
feature selection in the classification algorithm. In this paper, we
focus on filter methods so that an analyst does not need to know
the internals of the private classifier. Filters compute a ranking or a
score for features based on their correlation with their label. Filter
methods may rank/score individual features or sets of features. We
focus on methods that score individual features. Features can be
selected by choosing the top-k or those above some threshold τ .
Thus, the problem we consider can be stated as follows: LetD be
the set of all training datasets with binary features F and a binary
label L. Let Q : F × D → R be a scoring function that quantifies
how well F predicts L for a specific dataset. Let Fτ denote the
subset of features such that ∀F ∈ Fτ , Q(F,D) > τ . Two subsets
of features F1,F2 ⊂ F , are similar if their symmetric difference
is small. An example measure of similarity between F1 and F2 is
the Jaccard distance (defined as |F1 ∩ F2|/|F1 ∪ F2|).
PROBLEM 1 (SCOREBASEDFS). Given a datasetD ∈ D and
a threshold τ , compute F ′ ⊂ F while satisfying ǫ-differential pri-
vacy such that the similarity between F ′ and Fτ is maximized.
We next describe a few example scoring methods, and present
differentially private algorithms for the SCOREBASEDFS problem.
3.1 Example Scoring Functions
Total Count: The total count score for a feature F , denoted by
TC(F,D), is nF=1 the number of tuples with t[F ] = 1. Picking
features with a large total count eliminates features that rarely take
the value 1.
Difference Count: The difference count score for a feature F , de-
noted by DC(F,D), is defined as:
DC(F,D) = |nF=1∧L=1 − nF=1∧L=0| (3)
DC(F,D) is large whenever one label is more frequent than the
other label for F = 1. The difference count is smallest when both
labels are equally likely for tuples with F = 1. The difference
count is the largest when L is either all 1s or all 0s when condi-
tioned on F = 1.
Purity Index [11]: The purity index for a feature F , denoted by
PI(F,D), is defined as:
PI(F,D) = max
{
|nF=1∧L=1 − nF=1∧L=0|,
|nF=0∧L=1 − nF=0∧L=0|
}
(4)
PI(F,D) is the same as DC(F,D), except that it also considers
the difference in counts when the feature takes the value 0.
Information Gain: Information gain is a popular measure of cor-
relation between two attributes and is defined as follows.
Algorithm 1 Cluster Selection (Q(·), ǫfs, rounds, centers, s, τ )
points← {counts needed for Q(F,D) | F ∈ F)}
clusters← pkmeans(points, rounds, centers, ǫfs, s)
accepted← {}
for cluster in clusters do
center ← cluster.center()
if score(center) ≥ τ then
accepted.add(cluster.features())
end if
end for
return accepted
DEFINITION 4 (INFORMATION GAIN). The information en-
tropy H of a data set D is defined as:
H(D) = −
∑
ℓ∈L
PD(L = ℓ) lnPD(L = ℓ) (5)
The information gain for a specific feature F is defined as:
IG(F,D) = H(D)−
∑
f∈F
PD(F = f) ·H(DF=f) (6)
Information gain of a feature F is identical to the mutual informa-
tion of F and L.
3.2 Score Perturbation
A simple strategy for feature selection is: (a) perturb feature
scores using the Laplace mechanism, and (b) pick the features whose
noisy score crosses the threshold τ (or pick the top-k features sorted
by noisy scores). The scale of the Laplace noise required for pri-
vacy is S(Q) ·∆(Q)/ǫfs, where (i) S(Q) is the global sensitivity
of the scoring function on one feature, and (ii) ∆(Q) is the number
of feature scores that are affected by adding or removing one tuple.
The sensitivity of the total score TC, difference score DC, and
purity index PI are all 1. The sensitivity of information gain func-
tion has been shown to be O(log n) [9, 29], where n is (an upper
bound on) the number of tuples in the dataset. Information gain
is considered a better scoring function for feature selection in the
non-private case (than TC, DC or PI). However, due to its high
sensitivity, feature selection based on noisy information gain results
in lower accuracy, as poor features can get high noisy scores.
Recall that s is the maximum number of non-zeros appearing in
any tuple. Thus, ∆(TC) and∆(DC) are both s – these scores only
change for features with a 1 in the tuple that is added or deleted. On
the other hand, IG(F,D) and PI(F,D) can change whether t[F ]
is 1 or 0 for the tuple that is added or deleted. Thus, ∆(IG) and
∆(PI) are equal to the total number of features |F| >> s. 1 High
sensitivity due to a large s or a large ∆(Q) can result in poor utility
(poor features selected). Moreover, we observe (see Section 5.1)
that a large s also results in lower accuracy of private classification.
We can circumvent this by sampling; from every tuple t choose at
most r features that have t[F ] = 1. Sampling is able to force a
bound on the number of 1s in any tuples, and thus limit the noise.
However, this comes at the cost of throwing away valuable data.
3.3 Cluster Selection
The shortcoming of score perturbation is that we are adding noise
individually to the scores of all the features. As the number of fea-
tures increases, the probability that undesirable features get chosen
1If we used bounded differential privacy where neighboring
datasets have the same number of tuples, we can show that∆(Q) ≤
2 · s for any scoring function, since the neighboring datasets differ
in values of at most 2 · s attributes.
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Algorithm 2 Private Threshold Testing (D,Q, τ )
τ˜ ← τ + Lap(1/ǫ)
for each query Qi ∈ Q do
if Qi(D) ≥ τ˜ then
v[i]← 1
else
v[i]← 0
end if
end for
return v
increases (due to high noisy scores), thus degrading the utility of
the selected features. One method to reduce the amount of noise
added is to privately cluster the features based on their scores, com-
pute a representative score for each private cluster, and then pick
features from high scoring clusters. This is akin to recent work on
data dependent mechanisms for releasing histograms and answer-
ing range queries that group categories with similar counts and re-
lease a single noisy count for each group [16, 18, 28].
We represent each feature F as a vector of counts required to
compute the scoring function Q. For instance, for TC and DC
scoring functions, F could be represented as a two dimensional
point using the counts nF=1∧L=0 and nF=1∧L=1. We use private
k-means clustering [4] to cluster the points. k-means clustering ini-
tializes the cluster centers (µ1, ..., µk) (e.g. randomly) and updates
them iteratively as follows: 1) assign each point to the nearest clus-
ter center, 2) recompute the center of each cluster, until reaching
some convergence criterion or a fixed number of iterations. This
algorithm can be made to satisfy differential privacy by privately
computing in each iteration (a) the number of points in each new
cluster, qa, and (b) the sum of the points in each cluster, qb. The
global sensitivity of qa is 1, and the global sensitivity of qb is ∆(Q)
(or r if sampling is used). The number of iterations is fixed, and the
privacy budget is split evenly across all the iterations.
Once clusters have been privately assigned, the centers them-
selves can be evaluated based on their coordinates. For instance,
TC and DC can be computed using the sum and difference (resp.)
of the two-dimensional cluster centers. Depending on the score of
the group all or none of the associated features will be accepted.
This score does not have to be perturbed as it is computed via the
centers that are the result of a private mechanism.
3.4 Private Threshold Testing
In this section we present a novel mechanism, called private
threshold testing (PTT), for the SCOREBASEDFS problem whose
utility is independent of both s and the number of features |F|, and
does not require sampling. Rather than perturbing the scores of
all the functions, PTT perturbs a threshold τ and returns the set of
features with scores greater than the perturbed threshold. We be-
lieve PTT has applications beyond feature selection and hence we
describe it more generally.
Let Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm} denote a set of real valued queries
over a dataset D, all of which have the same sensitivity σ. (In our
case, each Qi = Q(Fi, D), and m = |F|). PTT has as input
the set of queries Q and a real number τ , and outputs a vector
v ∈ {0, 1}m, where v[i] = 1 if and only if Qi(D) ≥ τ˜ .
The private algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 2. PTT creates
a noisy threshold τ˜ by adding Laplace noise with scale σ/ǫ to τ .
The output vector v is populated by comparing the unperturbed
query answer Q(D) to τ˜ . We can show that despite answering
m comparison queries (where m can be very large) each with a
sensitivity of σ, PTT ensures 2σǫ-differential privacy (rather than
mσǫ-differential privacy that results from a simple application of
sequential composition).
THEOREM 2. Private Threshold Testing is 2σǫ-differentially pri-
vate for any set of queries Q all of which have a sensitivity σ.
PROOF. (sketch) Consider the set of queries for which PTT out-
put 1 (call it Q1); i.e., for these queries, Q(D) > τ˜ . Note that for
any value of the noisy threshold, say τ˜ = z, if Q(D) ≥ z, then for
any neighboring database Q(D′) ≥ z − σ (since σ is the sensitiv-
ity). However, since τ˜ is drawn from the Laplace distribution, we
have that P (τ˜=z)
P (τ˜=z−σ)
≤ eσǫ. Therefore,
P (Q(D) = 1,∀Q ∈ Q1) =
∫
z
P (τ˜ = z)
∏
Q∈Q1
P (Q(D) > z)dz
≤ eσǫ
∫
z
P (τ˜ = z − σ)
∏
Q∈Q1
P (Q(D′) > z − σ)dz
= eσǫP (Q(D′) = 1,∀Q ∈ Q1)
An analogous bound for Q0 yields the requires e2σǫ bound.
We can show that τ can be chosen based on the database D. In fact
we can show the following stronger result for count-based queries.
COROLLARY 1. Let Q be a set of queries with sensitivity σ.
Let τ be a function on D that computes the threshold, also having
sensitivity σ. If the values ofQ and τ on D are non-decreasing (or
non-increasing) when a tuple is added (or deleted resp.) from D,
then PTT is σǫ-differentially private.
PROOF. (sketch) Case (i) τ is a constant: When D = D′ ∪
{t}, for all z, Qi(D) < z implies Qi(D′) < z. Thus, r0 =
P (Q(D)=0,∀Q∈Q0)
P (Q(D′)=0,∀Q∈Q0)
is already bounded above by 1, while r1 =
P (Q(D)=1,∀Q∈Q1)
P (Q(D′)=1,∀Q∈Q1)
is bounded above by eσǫ from proof of Tho-
erem 2. When D′ = D ∪ {t}, we have r1 < 1 and r0 ≤ eσǫ.
Case (ii) τ is a function of D: When D = D′∪{t}, it holds that
P (τ˜(D) = z) ≤ eσǫP (τ˜(D′) = z − σ). This is because τ (D′)
lies between [τ (D)− σ, τ (D)]. The rest of the proof remains.
While Theorem 2 applies to all our scoring functions (TC,DC, PI
and IG), the stronger result from Corollary 1 only applies to TC.
Advantages over prior work: First, PTT permits releasing whether
or not a set of query answers are greater than a threshold τ even if
the sensitivity of releasing the answers of all the queries may be
large. PTT only requires: (i) query answers to be real numbered
and (ii) each query has a small sensitivity σ. The privacy guarantee
is independent of the number of queries.
Next, PTT can output whether or not a potentially unbounded
number of query answers cross a threshold. This is a significant
improvement over the related sparse vector technique (SVT) first
described in Hardt [13], which allows releasing upto a constant c
query answers that are above a threshold τ . SVT works as follows:
(i) pick a noisy threshold τ˜ using ǫ/2 privacy budget, (ii) perturb
all the queries using Laplace noise using a budget of ǫ/2c, and (iii)
releasing the first c query answers whose noisy answers are greater
than τ˜ . Once c query answers are released the algorithm halts. PTT
is able to give a positive or negative answer for all queries, since it
does not release the actual query answers.
Finally, PTT does not add noise to the query answers, but only
compares them to a noisy threshold. This means that the answer to
a query for which PTT output 1 is in fact greater than the answer
to a query for which PTT output 0. This is unlike NOISYCUT, a
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technique used in Lee et al [17]. Both PTT and NOISYCUT solve the
same problem of comparing a set of query answers to a threshold.
While PTT only adds noise to the threshold, NOISYCUT adds noise
to both the query answers and the threshold. We experimentally
show (in Section 5.1) that PTT has better utility than NOISYCUT.
That is, suppose Q1 is the set of queries whose true answers are >
τ , and QP1 and QN1 are the set of queries with a 1 output according
to PTT and NOISYCUT, resp. We show that QP1 is almost always
more similar to Q1 than QN1 .
We quantify the utility of our feature selection algorithms by ex-
perimentally showing their effect on differentially private classi-
fiers in Section 5.
4. PRIVATE EVALUATION OF CLASSIFIERS
In this section, we describe an algorithm to quantify the accuracy
of any binary classifier under differential privacy on a test dataset
containing sensitive information.
4.1 ROC curves
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are typically used
to quantify the accuracy of binary classifers. Let Dtest be a test
dataset. For every tuple t ∈ Dtest, let t[L] ∈ {0, 1} denote the
true label, and p(t) ∈ [0, 1] denote the prediction returned by some
classifier (probability that t[L] = 1). Let n1 and n0 denote the
number of tuples with true label 1 and 0 respectively.
Given a threshold θ, we say that the predicted label pθ(t) is 1 if
p(t) > θ. Based on the true label as well as the predicted label (at
a given threshold θ), we can quantify the accuracy of the classifier
on the dataset as follows. True positives, TP (θ), are the tuples in
Dtest whose true label and predicted label equals 1; i.e., t[L] =
1 ∧ p(t) > θ. True negatives, TN(θ), denote the tuples whose
true and predicted labels are 0. False positives, FP (θ) are tuples
whose true label is 0 but the predicted label is 1. False negatives,
FN(θ) are tuples whose true label is 1 but the predicted label is 0.
We will use the notation TP (θ), FP (θ), etc. to both denote the set
of tuples as well as the cardinality of these sets.
The true-positive rate TPR(θ) is defined as the probability that a
tuple in the test set having label 1 is correctly classified to have label
1. The false-positive rateFPR(θ), is defined as the probability that
a data having label 0 is wrongly classified to have label 1. Thus,
TPR(θ) =
TP (θ)
n1
and FPR(θ) = FP (θ)
n0
(7)
The Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is defined by
plotting pairs of FPR(θ) versus TPR(θ) over all possible thresh-
olds θ ∈ Θ. ROC curve starts at (0,0) and ends at (1,1). In order to
evaluate the accuracy of a binary classifier, we consider the area un-
der the ROC curve (AUC). If the classifier is good, the ROC curve
will be close to the left and upper boundary and AUC will be close
to 1. On the other hand, if the classifier is poor, the ROC curve will
be close to the 45◦ line from (0,0) to (1,1) with AUC around 0.5.
Recent work [19] has shown that releasing the actual ROC curves
on a private test dataset can allow an attacker with prior knowl-
edge to reconstruct the test dataset. An extreme yet illustrative
example is as follows: suppose an attacker knows the entire test
dataset except one record. Given the real ROC curve, the attacker
can determine the unknown label by simply enumerating over all
labels (and checking which choice led to the given ROC curve).
Hence, directly releasing the real ROC curve may leak information
of the data and we need a differentially private method for generat-
ing ROC curves to protect the private test dataset.
4.2 Private ROC curves
Algorithm 3 PriROC (T, P, ǫ)
1. Use ǫ1 budget to choose the set of thresholds for computing
TPRs and FPRs
2. Use ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1 budget to compute the noisy TPRs and FPRs
at all thresholds
3. Postprocess the TPRs and FPRs sequences to maintain con-
sistency.
There are three important challenges when generating differen-
tially private ROC curves – (i) how to privately compute TPR and
FPR values, (ii) how many and what thresholds to pick, and (iii)
how to ensure the monotonicity of the TPR and FPR values.
One can use the Laplace mechanism to compute TPR(θ) and
FPR(θ). The global sensitivity of releasing n0 and n1 is 1. The
global sensitivity of each of the TP (θ) and FP (θ) values equals 1.
Thus they can all released by adding Laplace noise with sensitivity
2|Θ| + 1, where |Θ| is the number of thresholds. However, as we
will show later, the linear dependence of sensitivity on the number
of thresholds can lead to significant errors in the ROC curves and
the area under the curve.
This brings us to the next concern of the number of thresholds. In
the non-private case, one can pick all the prediction probabilities as-
sociated with each tuple in the test dataset as a threshold. However,
as |Θ| increases, more counts need to be computed leading to more
noise. Moreover, the predictions themselves cannot be publicly re-
leased, and hence the thresholds must be chosen in a private man-
ner. Finally, the true TPR and FPR values satisfy the following
monotonicity property: for all θ1 ≤ θ2, TPR(θ1) ≤ TPR(θ2)
and FPR(θ1) ≤ FPR(θ2). The private TPR and FPR values
must also satisfy this property to get a valid ROC curve.
Our algorithm for computing differentially private ROC curves,
called PriROC (Algorithm 3), addresses all the aforementioned con-
cerns. PriROC first privately chooses a set of thresholds (using pri-
vacy parameter ǫ1). By modeling TP and FP values as one-sided
range queries, PriROC can compute noisy TPRs and FPRs val-
ues (using the remaining privacy budget ǫ2) with much lower error
than using the Laplace mechanism. Finally, a postprocessing step
enforces the monotonicity of TPRs and FPRs. We next describe
these steps in detail.
4.2.1 Computing noisy TPRs & FPRs
Suppose we are given a set of thresholds Θ = {θ1, . . . , θℓ},
where θi > θi+1 for all i. Assume that θ0 = 1 and θℓ = 0. That
is, for all records t ∈ Dtest, the prediction p(t) is greater than θℓ,
but not greater than θ0. Since, TP (θ) corresponds to the number
of tuples t with t[L] = 1 ∧ p(t) ≥ θ, TP (θℓ) is the total number
of tuples with t[L] = 1 (denoted by n1). Similarly, FP (θℓ) is the
total number of tuples with t[L] = 0 (denoted by n0). Thus:
TPR(θi) =
TP (θi)
n1
=
TP (θi)
TP (θℓ)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ
FPR(θi) =
FP (θi)
n0
=
FP (θi)
FP (θℓ)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ
Therefore, an ROC curve can be constructed by just computing
TP (θi) and FP (θi) for all θi ∈ Θ.
We next observe that the true positive and false positive counts
each correspond to a set of one-sided range queries.
DEFINITION 5 (ONE-SIDED RANGE QUERY).
Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} denotes a set of counts. A query qj is
called a one sided range query, and qj(X) is the sum of the first
5
j elements in X . That is, qj(X) =
∑j
i=1 xi. The set Cn =
{q1, . . . , qn} denotes the workload of all one sided range queries.
In our context, let XTPΘ = {xTP1 , xTP2 , . . . , xTPℓ }, where xTPi
is the number of tuples t ∈ Dtest with t[L] = 1 and θi−1 ≥ p(t) >
θi. It is easy to check that TP (θi) is the sum of the first i counts in
XTPΘ . We can similarly define XFPΘ , and show that each FP (θi)
is also the answer to a one-sided range query qi on XTPΘ .
It is well known that the Laplace mechanism is not optimal in
terms of error for the workload of one-sided range queries Cn. Un-
der Laplace mechanism, each query answer would have a mean
square error of O(n2/ǫ2). Instead, using strategies like the hierar-
chical mechanism [14] or Privelet [27] allow answering each one-
sided range query with no more thanO(log3 n/ǫ2) error. In our ex-
periments, we use the Privelet mechanism to compute the TP and
FP counts with a privacy budget of ǫ2/2 for each. The Privelet al-
gorithm first computes the wavelet coefficients of the counts in X ,
adds noise to the wavelet coefficients and then reconstructs a new
Xˆ from the noisy wavelet coefficients. One-sided range queries are
computed on XˆTPΘ to get the TP counts and on XˆFPΘ to get the
FP counts, which in turn are used to construct the noisy TPR(θ)
and FPR(θ) values. Since all steps subsequent to Privelet do not
use the original data, the fact that releasing TPR(θ) and FPR(θ)
satisfies ǫ2-differential privacy follows from the privacy of Privelet.
4.2.2 Choosing Thresholds
There are two important considerations when choosing the set of
thresholds Θ. The number of thresholds must not be very large,
as the total error is directly related to |Θ|. At the same time, the
thresholds must be chosen carefully so that the ROC curve on those
thresholds is a good approximation of the ROC curve drawn using
all the predictions in the test data. We present two heuristics for
choosing Θ that take into account the above considerations.
A simple data-independent strategy for picking the set of thresh-
olds is to choose them uniformly from [0, 1]. More precisely, if
n is the cardinality of Dtest, we choose the number of thresholds
to be an α ∈ [0, 1] fraction of n, and choose the set of thresholds
to be Θ = {0, 1
⌊αn⌋
, 2
⌊αn⌋
, . . . , ⌊αn⌋−1
⌊αn⌋
, 1}. We call this strategy
α-FIXEDSPACE. This strategy works well when the predictions
P = {p(t)|t ∈ Dtest} are uniformly spread out in [0, 1]. Since,
α-FIXEDSPACE is data independent, ǫ1 = 0, and all the privacy
budget can be used for computing the TPR and FPR values.
α-FIXEDSPACE is not a good strategy in the general case. For in-
stance, suppose a majority of the predictions are less than the small-
est threshold θ1 = 1⌊αn⌋ . Then the ROC curve for all those points
will be approximated with a single point (TPR(θ1), FPR(θ1))
possibly resulting in a significant loss in accuracy in the AUC.
Hence, we present k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS, a data dependent
strategy that addresses skewed prediction distributions by recur-
sively partitioning the data domain such that each partition has
roughly the same number of tuples (Algorithm 4). The algorithm
takes as input ǫ, the privacy budget for choosing thresholds, k, the
number of recursive steps, and P = {p(t)|t ∈ Dtest}, the multiset
of predictions. As the name suggests the algorithm has k recursive
steps, and each uses a privacy budget of ǫ/k.
The algorithm recursively calls a subroutine FINDMEDIANS com-
puting the noisy median of all predictions within the range (left, right).
Initally, left = 0 and right = 1. Since median has a high global
sensitivity (equal to right if all values are in the range (left, right)),
we use the smooth sensitivity framework [21] for computing the
noisy median. We refer the reader to the original paper for details
on computing the smooth sensitivity for median. We choose to
Algorithm 4 k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS
function k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS(P,ǫ, k)
ǫ′ ← ǫ
k
return FINDMEDIANS(P,ǫ′, k, 0, 1)
end function
function FINDMEDIANS(P,ǫ′, k, left, right)
if k = 0 then return
end if
m← median(P )
m˜← m+
8S∗
fmed,ǫ
′
(P )
ǫ1
∗ z, z is random noise ∝ 1
1+z2
if m˜ ≤ left or m˜ ≥ right then
m˜ = (left+ right)/2
end if
P1 ← {P [i] | P [i]<m˜}
P2 ← {P [i] | P [i]>m˜}
return FINDMEDIANS(P1, ǫ′, k − 1, left, m˜) ∪ m˜∪
FINDMEDIANS(P2, ǫ′, k − 1, m˜, right)
end function
sample noise from distributionK/(1+ |z|2) (where K is a normal-
ization constant). We can generate samples from the distribution by
picking U uniformly from (0, 1) and computing tan(π(U − 0.5))
(since the CDF of the distribution is ∝ arctan(z)).
The resulting noisy median m˜ could fall out of the range (left, right).
This could either happen due to random chance, or more likely be-
cause the smooth sensitivity of the points within the range is high.
A high smooth sensitivity occurs either due to a small number of
data points, or when about half the data points are very close to
left, and the rest of the points are very close to right. Then a point
in the middle of the range (e.g., (left + right)/2) is a good par-
tition point, and is used instead of m˜. The algorithm proceeds to
recursively find the medians of points in (left, m˜) and (m˜, right).
The algorithm returns after it completes k levels of recursion. The
number of thresholds output by k−RecursiveMedians is 2k .
THEOREM 3. Algorithm 4 (k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS) satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy.
PROOF. (sketch) The proof follows from the following state-
ments: Computing the median of a set of points in each invocation
of FINDMEDIANS satisfies ǫ/k-differential privacy. This is true as
long as noise is drawn from the distribution∝ 1/(1+ |z|γ ), scaled
appropriately by the smooth sensitivity and γ ≥ 1. In each recur-
sive step, computing the medians in disjoint partitions of the data
satisfies ǫ/k-differential privacy by parallel composition. Since the
number of recursions is bounded by k, k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy by serial composition.
4.2.3 Ensuring monotonicity
TPR(θ) and FPR(θ) values in the original ROC curve are
monotonic. That is, the true positive rates satisfy the following
constraint: 0 ≤ TPR(θ1) ≤ . . . ≤ TPR(θℓ) = 1. However,
this may not be true of the noisy TPR and FPR values (gener-
ated using the strategy from the previous section). We leverage the
ordering constraint between the TPR and FPR values to boost
the accuracy by using the constrained inference method proposed
by Hay et al [14]. Since this is a postprocessing step, there is no
impact on privacy.
The error introduced by our algorithms for generating ROC curves
varies with different datasets. Therefore, we empirically evaluate
the utility of our algorithms on real data in the next section.
6
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we experimentally evaluate our differentially pri-
vate algorithms for feature selection (Section 5.1)) and generating
ROC curves (Section 5.2). The main takeaways from the exper-
imental evaluation on differentially private feature selection are:
• Spending a part of the privacy budget for private feature selec-
tion can significantly improve the misclassification rate (10%
- 15%) of a differentially private classifier. This is despite a
noisier classifier due to the smaller privacy budget.
• Feature selection using private threshold testing consistently re-
sults in classifiers with higher accuracy than feature selection
using score perturbation and cluster selection PTT also signif-
icantly outperforms a related technique NOISYCUT in solving
the SCOREBASEDFS problem.
• In the differential privacy regime, simple scoring techniques
(like total count TC) perform as well or even better than mea-
sures like information gain IG that are considered best in the
non-private regime.
The main takeaways from the experimental evaluation on differen-
tially private ROC curves are:
• The area under the curve (AUC) measure for the differentially
private ROC curves are close to the AUC measures for the true
ROC curves. Therefore, with high probability differentially pri-
vate ROC curves can be used to distinguish between classifiers
that are significantly different.
• The AUC error for ROC curves generated by PriROC is signif-
icantly smaller than AUC error for ROC curves based on true
and false positive rates computed using the Laplace mechanism.
• The k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS method to pick thresholds results
in better ROC curves than using α-FIXEDSPACE.
• The number of thresholds chosen to generate the differentially
private ROC curve does not significantly affect the AUC error.
5.1 Feature Selection
5.1.1 Setup
We use three text classification datasets - TWITTER, SMS and
REUTERS. The TWITTER dataset [10] was collected for the task
of sentiment classification. Each tweet is associated with a bi-
nary sentiment label – positive or negative. The datast contains 1.6
million tweets from which we randomly sampled 7304 tweets for
our experiments. We constructed binary features for every word
(excluding stop words) resulting a total of 32935 features. Since
each tweet contained at most 20 non-stop words, we set s = 20.
The SMS dataset [1] contains 5574 SMS messages associated with
spam/ham label. The dataset has a total of 8021 features. Since
SMS messages are short, we again set s = 20. The REUTERS
dataset consists of 21578 news articles tagged with topics. To get a
training dataset with a binary class label, we chose a corpus of 6906
articles labeled as earnings-related or not (based on the ”earn” topic
keyword). Since an article does not have a word limit, we do not
have a small bound on s like in TWITTER or SMS. The total num-
ber of features is 33389.
We choose to evaluate our feature selection algorithm on two
state of the art differentially private classifiers – Naive Bayes [25],
and the differentially private ERM implementation of logistic re-
gression [2]. The Naive Bayes (NB) classifier assumes that the
features are conditionally independent given the label L. Given a
feature vector x ∈ {0, 1}|F|, the predicting label given by
argmaxℓ∈{0,1}Pr[L = ℓ] ·
∏
F∈F
Pr[F = x[F ]|L = ℓ]
Thus, the Naive Bayes classifier can be made private by releasing
differentially private counts of n, nL=ℓ, and nF=i∧L=ℓ from the
training data set, for i, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}.
Logistic regression models the log odds of the prediction as lin-
ear function of the features. Empirical risk minimization is used
to fit the linear model given a dataset. For non-private logistic re-
gression, we have used the prepackaged Scikit-learn logistic regres-
sion classifier [22]. We use an implementation of Chaudhuri et al’s
[2] differentially private empirical risk minimization (henceforth
called ERM) for logistic regression.
The accuracy of a classifier is measured using the fraction of
predictions that match the true label on a held out test set. The
results are average over 10 runs (using 10-fold cross validation) to
account for the noise introduced due to differential privacy.
5.1.2 Feature Selection Results
Figure 1 presents a comparison of all the discussed feature selec-
tion methods across all three data sets using a non-private and a pri-
vate naive bayes classifier. In the non-private case (Figures 1(a),1(c),
and 1(e)), we see a small improvement in the accuracy using all
three scoring techniques TC, DC and IG. PI resulted in a simi-
lar accuracy as DC and is not shown. IG has the highest accuracy
for all the datasets.
In the private case (Figures 1(b),1(d), and 1(f)), ‘All’ corresponds
to no feature selection, and ‘All-sampling’ correponds to using all
the features but with sampling (to reduce the sensitivity) with r =
10. For the private graphs, the total ǫ-budget is 1.0. We see that
even though sampling throws away valuable data, we already see
an increase in the accuracy. This is because sampling also helps
reduce the sensitivity of the classifier training algorithm. Note that
we do not report the ‘All’ bar for REUTERS– since we can’t bound
the lenght of an article, the sufficient statistics for the naive bayes
classifier have a very high sensitivity. We also show the accuracy
of the majority classifier, which always predicts the majority class.
Next we add feature selection. Both score perturbation and clus-
tering are used in conjunction with sampling (to reduce sensitivity).
Private threshold testing (PTT) does not use sampling. For score
perturbation the budget split is .5 for selection and .5 for classifica-
tion (budget split is discussed in Section 5.1.4). For clustering and
PTT the budget split is .2 for selection and .8 for classification.
We see that most of the feature selection techniques (and scor-
ing functions) result in a higher accuracy than ‘All-sampling’. One
exception is IG due to its high sensitivity. Additionally as noted
in section 3.2, experiments with score perturbation of Information
Gain were run under bounded differential privacy (since the sensi-
tivity of IG is higher under unbounded differential privacy). We
see poor accuracy with IG and score perturbation despite this. We
do not report IG under clustering and PI under score perturbation
and clustering due to their high sensitivity. We are surprised to see
that TC is as good as or better than “best” non-private scoring tech-
niques across all three datasets and all differentially private feature
selection techniques. This is due to its low sensitivity. We also note
a trend that PTT with TC is more accurate than clustering with TC
which is in turn more accurate than score perturbation with TC.
Figure 2 contains the same tests, but with the ERM classifier.
We only show results on the SMS dataset due to space constraints.
We found that the private ERM code does not scale well to large
number of features. For that reason we first selected the top 5000
features according to TC scoring function and used that in place
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(f) Reuters Private
Figure 1: Naive Bayes classification with the TWITTER, SMS and REUTERS datasets.
of the ‘All’ features. Feature selection was then performed on this
restricted dataset. We see the same trends as in the case of the Naive
Bayes classifier. The results are comparable to those run on the
private Naive Bayes classifier, but with a lower accuracy overall.
This lower accuracy could be because Naive Bayes is known to
outperform other methods for the text classification task.
5.1.3 SCOREBASEDFS Comparison
We also evaluate the quality of the just the feature selection algo-
rithms (without considering a classifier). The accuracy of a feature
selection technique is quantified as follows. Let Fτ be the true set
of features whose scores are greater than the threshold (under some
fixed scoring function), and letF ′ be the set of features returned by
a differentially private algorithm for SCOREBASEDFS. We define
precision (pre), recall (rec) and F1-score (F1) as follows:
pre =
|Fτ ∩ F
′|
|F ′|
, rec =
|Fτ ∩ F
′|
|Fτ |
, F1 =
2 · pre · rec
pre+ rec
Figure 3 shows the F1 scores for 4 private feature selection meth-
ods using TC – score perturbation, clustering, PTT and NOISYCUT
[17]. The x-axis corresponds to different thresholds τ . The x-axis
values on the top represent |Fτ |.
There are two notable features of these plots. First, PTT does the
best of all selection methods at all thresholds. This is due to the fact
that only the threshold is perturbed. Since the ordering of feature
scores is maintained, F ′ is a superset of Fτ (with rec = 1) or is a
subset of Fτ (with pre = 1). In particular it significantly outper-
forms NOISYCUT under small thresholds (or when many features
must be chosen). Second, we are able to see what settings would
cause the other methods to struggle. Both score perturbation and
NOISYCUT have poorer accuracy as τ decreases (or number of fea-
tures increases). This is because feature score are perturbed, and as
we increase the number of features to be selected there is a larger
chance that good features are eliminated and poorer features are re-
turned just by random chance. Clustering shows the reverse trend.
This is because low scoring features tend to cluster together result-
ing in large clusters (resulting in low sensitivity). The same is not
true for high scoring features.
5.1.4 Parameter Tuning
In this section we present empirical justification for some of our
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(b) SMS Private
Figure 2: Logisitic regression with the SMS dataset. ERM used for private regression.
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(b) NOISYCUT
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(c) Score Perturbation
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(d) Cluster
Figure 3: F1 Score Comparison among 4 Private Feature Selection Algorithms on SMS data
design choices – budget split, and sample rate selection. We defer
the problem of classifier agnostic automatic parameter tuning to
future work.
Privacy Budget Split: We empirically tested the accuracy of the
classifier with feature selection under different budget splits. Fig-
ures 5(a) and 5(b) show (on the TWITTER and SMS datasets, resp.)
one example of Naive Bayes classification with score perturbation
using the TC score function. We see that the best accuracy is
achieved when feature selection and classification equally split the
budget. Since clustering and PTT have much lower sensitivities we
find than a much smaller part of the budget (0.2) is required for
these techniques to get the best accuracy (graphs not shown).
Splitting data vs Privacy Budget: Rather than splitting the pri-
vacy budget, one could execute feature selection and classification
on disjoint subsets of the data. By parallel composition, one can use
all the privacy budget for both tasks. However, experiments on the
Naive Byes classifier with PTT showed splitting the data resulted in
classifiers whose average accuracy was very close to that of the ma-
jority classifier. Since feature selection is run on a slightly different
dataset, wrong features are being chosen for classifier training.
Sampling Rate Selection: Figures 5(c) and 5(d) show the change
in system accuracy as the sampling rate r is changed for the SMS
and TWITTER data sets. We see that selecting alow sampling rate is
detrimental since too much information is lost. Alternatively select-
ing a sampling rate that is too high loses accuracy from increasing
the sensitivity used when drawing noise for privacy. A moderate
rate of sampling that preserves enough information while reducing
the required global sensitivity for privacy will do best.
Total Budget Selection Figure 4 shows the accuracy of the private
classifier with the best private score perturbation, clustering and
PTT feature selection algorithm under different settings of the total
privacy budget (ǫ = 1, 0.5, 0.25 and 0.1). The same settings for
budget split and sampling are held throughout. For the TWITTER
and REUTERS datasets (which are harder to predict) we see the ac-
ǫ AUC Error
Laplace α-FIXEDSPACE k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS
SMS TWI SMS TWI SMS TWI
1 0.218 0.073 0.034 0.065 0.023 0.055
0.5 0.343 0.108 0.042 0.094 0.029 0.063
0.25 0.372 0.211 0.079 0.151 0.054 0.102
0.1 0.442 0.340 0.146 0.229 0.092 0.203
Table 1: ROC area L1 error (median) for both SMS and
TWITTER datasets based on all possible thresholds
curacy begin to approach the majority classifier as the total budget
is reduced to 0.1.
5.2 Private Evaluation
We use the held out test sets of the SMS and TWITTER datasets
which come from the previous section. SMS test set contains 558
data, and each tuple t has a true label t[L] ∈ {0, 1} as well as a
prediction p(t) ∈ [0, 1] for the label 1. In SMS, 481 out of 558
data have true label equals 1. The TWITTER test dataset contains
684 different tuples, 385 of which have label equal to 1.
Figure 6 shows the real ROC curves as well as the differentially
private ROC curves for both SMS and TWITTER datasets under 4
different privacy budgets by using k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS. Re-
call that, in k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS, ǫ1 privacy budget is used for
selecting a set of thresholds, and ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1 is used for generating
the ROC curve. We set ǫ1 = 0.2ǫ.
The solid line refers to the real ROC curve, while the dashed line
represents the differentially private ROC curve. When the privacy
budget is not small (ǫ = 1), the private ROC curve is very close
to the real ROC curve, which means our private ROC curve is a
good replacement of the real ROC curve, correctly reflecting the
performance of the input classifier.
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Figure 4: Accuracy of the system versus total budget selection.
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Figure 5: Tuning the budget split (without sampling) and sampling rate (with a 50% budget split).
Figure 7 reports the comparison of the errors among three differ-
ent algorithms. The Laplace line refers to the error by directly using
Laplace Mechanism using t thresholds (that can be chosen based on
the data). The FixedSpace line shows the error of α-FIXEDSPACE,
with α · n thresholds chosen uniformly in [0, 1]. And the line
RecursiveMedians presents the error of k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS,
with 2k thresholds. The x-axis corresponds to ǫ and the y-axis cor-
responds to the L1 error of the area between the real ROC curve
and the private ROC curve under certain privacy budget. The error
shows the median value after running our algorithm 10 times. The
reason why we pick the median error instead of the average value
is to counter the effect of outliers.
To understand the effect of choosing differing numbers of thresh-
olds, we choose α = 1, 0.5, 0.25 and 0.125. The ensure that the
noise introduced is roughly the same in all algorithms, we vary t
and k as 10, 9, 8 and 7. For instance, for α = 1 and t, k = 10, we
haveO(n) thresholds forα-FIXEDSPACE and k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS
(29 ≤ n ≤ 210 for the SMS and TWITTER datasets), and O(log n)
thresholds for Laplace.
In figure 7, we can see that k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS and α-
FIXEDSPACE can largely improve the accuracy of the output com-
pared with directly using Laplace Mechanism under all ǫ and α set-
tings. The difference in error is largest for small epsilon. Although
the noise scale is the same for the three methods in each experi-
ment, since the number of thresholds is very small the LaplaceROC
curve can’t hope to approximate the true ROC curve well enough.
Furthermore, for both datasets, the k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS method
performs better than α-FIXEDSPACE method under nearly all pa-
rameter settings, which means computing noisy quantiles help choose
the right set of thresholds.
Table 1 represents the graphs in Figure 7 for t, k = 10 and α = 1
in tabular form. It is interesting to note that k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS
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Figure 8: Number of thresholds: SMS (left) and TWITTER
(right) datasets, based on all ǫ
has 10 times lower error than Laplace for ǫ = 1 on SMS.
5.2.1 Choosing the number of thresholds
The value of α inα-FIXEDSPACE and k in k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS
determines the number of thresholds we will use to compute ROC
curve. It will affect three different aspects. First, the bigger size
of thresholds, the better we ca hope to approximate the true ROC
curve. Second, larger threshold sets result in larger noise being
used to perturb TPRs and FPRs. Third, the last step of our al-
gorithm is to do postprocessings in order to maintain consistency
and its relationship to α, k is not very clear. Our goal is to pick the
value of α, k which lead to the best trade off.
Figure 8 presents the comparions of the errors for k-RECURSIVEMEDIANS
among different choies for k under all ǫ values. The x-axis show
4 different settings for k. We can see that for both datasets, there
is no specific setting of k that leads to the best performance of k-
RECURSIVEMEDIANS for all ǫ settings. The graph looks similar
for α-FIXEDSPACE (not shown).
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Figure 6: True & Private ROC curves, SMS (above) and TWITTER (below) datasets, ǫ = 1, 0.5, 0.25 and 0.1 (left to right)
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Figure 7: Error Comparison, SMS (above) and TWITTER (below) datasets
Thus, it seems best to set k = ⌈log n⌉. The following is one pos-
sible reason for the AUC error not depending on k: One may pick
a small number of thresholds to reduce the noise if the true ROC
curve can be accurately described using a small number of points.
But in this case, the postprocessing step that enforces monotonicity
results in error that has a strong dependence on the number of dis-
tinct TPR and FPR values, and not the total number of thresholds
(see Theorem 2 [14]).
6. RELATED WORK
Differentially Private Classifiers: Private models for classifica-
tion has been a popular area of exploration for privacy research.
Previous work has produced differentially private training algo-
rithms for Naive Bayes classification [25], decision trees [9, 15],
logistic regression [2, 30] and support vector machines [2] amongst
others. Apart from classifier training, Chaudhuri el al. [26] present
a generic algorithm for differentially private parameter tuning and
model selection. However, this work does not assume a blackbox
classifier, and makes strong stability assumptions about the training
algorithm. In contrast, our algorithms are classifier agnostic. Addi-
tionally Thakurtha et al. [24] present an algorithm for model selec-
tion again assuming strong stability assumptions about the model
training algorithm. We would like to note that the work in these pa-
per is in some sense orthogonal to the feature selection algorithms
we present, and can be used in conjunction with the results in the
paper (for instance, to choose the right threshold τ or the right num-
ber of features to select).
Private Threshold Testing: As mentioned before, private thresh-
old testing (PTT) is inspired by the sparse vector technique (SVT)
[13] which was first used in the context of the multiplicative weights
mechanism [12]. While PTT aims to only release whether or not
a query answer is greater than a threshold, SVT releases the actual
answers that are above the threshold and thus can only release a
constant number of answers. Lee et al [17] solve the same problem
as PTT in the context of frequent itemset mining. The propose an
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algorithm NOISYCUT which we show is inferior to PTT. While the
techniques for proving the privacy of all these techniques are simi-
lar, our proof for PTT is the tightest thus allowing us only add noise
to the threshold and get the best utility (amongst competitors) for
answering comparison queries.
Private Evaluation: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
are used quantifying the prediction accuracy of binary classifiers.
However, directly releasing the ROC curve may reveal the sensi-
tive information of the input dataset [19]. In this paper, we propose
the first differentially private algorithm for generating private ROC
curves under differential privacy. Chaudhuri et al [26] proposes a
generic technique for evaluating a classifier on a private test set.
However, they assume that the global sensitivity of the evaluation
algorithm is low. Hence, their work will not apply to generating
ROC curves, since the sufficient statistics for generating the ROC
curve (the set of true and false positive counts) have a high global
sensitivity. Despite this high sensitivity, we present strategies that
can privately compute ROC curves with very low noise by model-
ing the sufficient statistics as one-sided range queries.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented algorithms that can aid the adoption
of differentially private methods for classifier training on private
data. We present novel algorithms for private feature selection and
experimentally show using three real high dimensional datasets that
spending a part of the privacy budget for feature selection can im-
prove the prediction accuracy of the classifier trained on the se-
lected features. Moreover, we also solve the problem of privately
generating ROC curves. This allows a user to quantify the predic-
tion accuracy of a binary classifier on a private test dataset. In con-
junction, these algorithms can now allow a data analyst to mimic
typical ‘big-data’ workflows that (a) preprocess the data (i.e., select
features), (b) build a model (i.e., train a classifier), and (c) evaluate
the model on a held out test set (i.e., generate an ROC curve) on
private data while ensuring differential privacy without sacrificing
too much accuracy.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
PROOF. For any two neighboring datasets D and D′, we would
like to show:
P (vD → vˆ)
P (vD′ → vˆ)
≤ e2σǫ
where vD and vD′ denote the outputs of the non private threshold
test on D and D′ resp., and vˆ is the output of PTT. Let N1 = {i ∈
[m] |vˆ[i] = 1} and N0 = {i ∈ [m] |vˆ[i] = 0} denote the set of 1
and 0 answers resp. of PTT. Let vˆ[< i] denote the answers returned
by PTT for queries 1 through i− 1. Then
P (vD → vˆ)
P (vD′ → vˆ)
=
∏
i∈[m]
P (Qi(D) = vˆ[i] | vˆ[< i])
P (Qi(D′) = vˆ[i] | vˆ[< i])
=
∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D) = 1 | vˆ[< i])
P (Qi(D′) = 1 | vˆ[< i])
×
∏
i∈N0
P (Qi(D) = 0 | vˆ[< i])
P (Qi(D′) = 0 | vˆ[< i])∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D) = 1 | vˆ[< i])
=
∫
z
P (τ˜ = z)
∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D) = 1 | τ˜ = z)dz
=
∫
z
P (τ˜ = z)
∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D) > z)dz
The following two facts complete the proof. First, for any z,
P (τ˜ = z) ≤ eσǫP (τ˜ = z − σ) (8)
Second, for neighboring databases D and D′,
Qi(D) ≥ z ⇒ Qi(D
′) ≥ z − σ
P (Qi(D) ≥ z) ≤ P (Qi(D
′) ≥ z − σ) (9)
Therefore, we get:∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D) = 1 | vˆ[< i])
=
∫
z
P (τ˜ = z)
∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D) > z)dz
≤ eσǫ
∫
z
P (τ˜ = z − σ)
∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D
′) > z − σ)dz
= eσǫ
∏
i∈N1
P (Qi(D
′) = 1 | vˆ[< i])
An analogous proof for N0 gives the required bound of e2σǫ.
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